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The Manager 
Schenectady Naval Reactors Office 
United States Department of Energy 
Schenectady, New York 
Subject: Space Power Program, Instrumentation and Control System Architecture, 
Preconceptual Design, for Information (U) 
References: See page 7. 
Enclosures: See page 7. 
Dear Sir: 
Pur~ose:  
~ h e ' ~ u r ~ o s e  f this letter is to forward the Prometheus preconceptual Instrumentation and 
Control (I&C) system architecture (Enclosure (1)) to NR for information as part of the 
Prometheus closeout work. 
Summary: 
The preconceptual 1&C system architecture was considered a key planning document for 
development of the I&C system for Project Prometheus. This architecture was intended to set 
the technical approach for the entire I&C system. It defines interfaces to other spacecraft 
systems, defines hardware blocks for future development, and provides a basis for accurate cost 
and schedule estimates. Since the system requirements are not known at this time, it was 
anticipated that the architecture would evolve as the design of the reactor module was matured. 
The reference architecture (See Figure 1) was selected from several different alternatives for its 
relative simplicity and fault tolerance. The selected architecture uses a 3-layer approach 
consisting of a supervisor, reactor controller, and actuators. Redundancy is implemented 
differently in each layer to achieve system fault tolerance: 
Supervisor: Three Supervisor Channels, configured in a HoVWarmlCold or a HotiWarmlWarm 
configuration, are used to provide overall system control. The Supervisor Channels perform the 
following functions: 
Collect diagnostic data from the Reactor Controller Channels and send this to the 
spacecraft flight computer for telemetry. 
Distribute and coordinate software upgrades. 
Monitor the Reactor Controller Channels and determine any changes in coincidence for 
output control that should be used, and communicate this coincidence change to the 
Slider Controllers. 
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Reactor Controller: Four Reactor Controller Channels in a channel coincidence configuration 
provide sensing and control of the reactor. The Reactor Controller Channels perform the 
following functions: 
Monitor plant parameters via sensors and interface cards. 
Provide control actions to maintain the reactor in proper control bands. 
Provide telemetry data back to the Supervisor Channels. 
4 Provide and receive data directly tolfrom the Power Conditioning and Distribution (PCAD) 
system for command and monitoring purposes. 
Sensors and interface cards are provided to measure temperature, pressure, flow, position of 
reactivity and flow control devices (sliders, valves, and safety rod(s)), and neutron flux. These 
sensors were chosen to provide the necessary parameters for reactor plant control and handling 
of reactor plant casualties. In all cases except for continuous slider position indication, and 
discrete position sensors (sliders, valves, and safety rod(s)), there is an independent set of 
sensors for each Reactor Controller Channel to maintain channel independence and resilience 
to sensor failure. 
During normal operation all four Reactor Controller Channels are operating. The Reactor 
Controller Channels monitor sensor inputs, execute algorithms, and send outputs through 
coincidence circuits to control the sliders. Bi-directional data links connect the Reactor 
Controllers to the Supervisor Channels and to the PCAD system. The PCAD system controls 
both the speed of the Brayton rnachine(s) and circuit breakers in the electric plant. 
Actuators: There are twelve independent slider control channels, each corresponding ta one of 
the twelve (assumed) sliders used for reactivity control. The Slider Controllers have the 
following functions: 
Apply coincidence logic to the Reactor Controller Channel outputs to determine if a slider 
should be moved. 
Control the slider's motion by controlling a three phase stepper motor drive. 
Interface with slider position sensors to determine slider position. 
Detect potential errors and communicate errors as well as slider position, error, fault, and 
status information back to the Reactor Controller Channels. 
Separate controllers are provided for actuation of valves (if needed) and the safety rod(s). These 
controllers are redundant to provide single fault tolerance. These controllers provide both 
actuation and position feedback. 
The selected architecture can be implemented with approximately 45 circuit cards and a total 
mass of approximately 320kg including sensors, cables, and electronics. 
Background: 
The NRPCT developed a notional I&C system architecture, defined in Enclosure (4), to provide a 
basis for developing project planning estimates for manpawer and hardware development. The 
notional l&C system architecture was intended to be evolved as mission and system 
requirements were developed. As the project continued, trade studies were identified to begin 
the refinement of salient architecture features. The preconceptual I&C system architecture 
(Enclosure (7 ) )  selected is the result of 9 trade studies performed on I&C system attributes and 
applied to the notional architecture. Enclosure (3) discusses the basis for the trade studies. The 
notional architecture provided the basis for Reference (a), which documents the Space Reactor 
Planning Estimate - Basis for Estimate. Included as part of Reference (a) is the circuit card and 
card rack summary and the sensor cost summary, which were used to provide cost estimates 
and assumptions for the preconceptual l&C system architecture as well as the trade studies. 
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The notional architecture provided a- basis for project planning and for discussions with other 
spacecraft design agents to develop interface specifications between the Reactor I&C Segment 
and the Command €4 Data Handling and Power Conditioning & Distribution subsystems. 
The basic aspects required to fully specify an I&C system are: 
Sensors/lnterfaces 
Actuators 
Monitoring and Control Algorithms 
Design Events 
Required Fault Tolerance. 
The t&C system sensors and actuators are considered to be sufficiently defined for the selection 
of the preconceptual I&C system architecture. Although a monitoring and control scheme is not 
defined at this time, key plant parameters forming the basis of candidate control schemes are 
sufficiently defined and included in this preconceptual 1&C system architecture. The 
computational nodes within the I&C architecture are identified herein but the specific monitoring 
and control algorithms would have been specified in the next design phase. Algorithm 
development would not be anticipated to impact the I&C system architecture as a basis set of 
information (plant sensors) required by the algorithms is provided. 
The preconceptual I&C system architecture is considered to support all potential control 
strategies for the reactor plant, including a control band strategy. The control strategies would 
be specified in a future design phase. In a control band strategy, the following must hold true: 
The control band must be greater than the total accuracy of the controlling parameter's 
a sensor. The margin between the design limits and the control band limits must be greater than 
half of the total sensor accuracy of the controlling parameter(s). - 
The above two requirements result in a parameter (e.g., coolant temperature) design limit range 
that is greater than twice the total instrumentation accuracy. For example, if the instrumentation 
error is +/- 5K (total instrumentation accuracy is IOK), the controt band must be greater than 10K 
and the design limit range must be greater than 20K. This range applies to either single channel 
or multiple channels with coincidence architectures. Therefore, accuracy and control band were 
not determining factors in the architecture selection. However, the impact on the system 
parameter design range and feedback on plant component sizing emphasizes the need to 
minimize instrumentation errorsin any control architecture. 
The preconceptual reactor design concept has sufficient reactivity margin for design lifetime with 
a single slider fully inserted or fully withdrawn as established in Reference (b) and it is a goal to 
maximize power capability with this condition. The design of the preconceptual I&C system 
architecture for the Prometheus project postulated that slider casualties (including mechanical 
failures such as a stuck or frozen slider) are credible design events. Therefore, the I&C system 
must be designed to preclude multiple slider casualties originating from a single failure in the 
I&C system. A single slider casualty may require actuation of the remaining I 1  sliders in 
response to the reactivity transient. This design event drove the preconceptual I&C system 
design toward single slider control, as well as single valve control (if isolation valves are 
required). It is anticipated that additional design events, such as casualties emanating from the 
Energy Conversion Segment, Heat Rejection Segment, or single event upsets (SEUs) in 
electronic components, should be identified in the future but will only impact the algorithms 
(system requirements) and not impact the preconceptual l&C system architecture. The single 
failure criterion was a major design driver and was considered to provide sufficient fault 
to!erance in the preconceptual I&C system. 
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Discussion: 
The I&C system architectures described in Enclosures (q), (4), and (5) are considered to be 
preconceptual. In some cases, design details are given for illustrative purposes only. Specific 
design details would be evaluated during the design phase of the project. The trade studies 
listed herein (Enclosures (6) through (14)) encompass some (but not all) of the evaluations 
needed to achieve a robust control system which would ensure continuity of reactor power to the 
spacecraft's energy conversion system. Enclosures (4) through (1 5) are summarized as follows: 
Enclosure (4) describes the notional architecture. The notional architecture was the 
planning baseline for Reference (a). The notional architecture uses four hot reactor 
controller channels to control the slider controllers based on independent sensor inputs. 
The supervisor channels are in a hot/warm/cold configuration and are used to perform 
diagnostic testing and pass telemetry data to ground control. The notional architecture 
uses a separate coincidence logic module as well as coincidence within each slider 
controller to pass commands from the reactor controller channels. The design of the 
notional architecture does not require microcontrollers for coincidence, but is flexible 
enough to include them if desired. 
Enclosure (5) describes Architecture 2. This is an evolution of the notional architecture 
documented in Enclosure (4) based on the outcomes of the trade studies. Some 
advantages of Architecture 2 over the notional architecture are as follows: 
o Utilizes bidirectional serial interfaces for communication between architecture 
layers, to improve reliability, extensibility, diagnostics, and allows for remote 
software upgrades at all levels of the architecture. 
o Eliminates an architecture "layer" by performing coincidence at the slider and 
valve controllers inste'ad of using a separate layer for coincidence. This results in 
fewer interconnections, improved response time, and a lower card count. 
o Made several changes to improve fault tolerance (e.g., utilizing more "point-of- 
use" power supplies, providing improved separation of slider indication circuitry), 
while reducing card count, cost, and system mass. 
0 Enclosure (6) provides the result of a comparison trade study for a secondary electronics 
vautt. It shows that implementing a secondary electronics vault closer to the reactor, for 
the purpose of multiplexing signals to reduce cable mass, is not practical. The increase 
in mass for shielding the secondary vault outweighs the increase in cabling required 
without multiplexing signals. 
Enclosure (7) evaluates the pros and cons of one power supply versus two power 
supplies used in each Reactor Controller Channel (RCC) and each Reactor Supervisor 
Channel (RSC). The trade study recommends using one power supply per Reactor 
Controller Channel, and one power supply per Supervisor Channel if the probability of 
failure of a power supply card is not much greater than other cards. 
Enclosure (8) evaluates the use of three bus options for communication within card 
racks. Versa Module Eurocard bus (VMEbus) is traded against Compact Peripheral 
Component Interface bus (cPCI bus) and against using a serial data bus. The three 
options trade commonality, numbers of cards allowed per card rack, flexibility, and 
bandwidth. This trade study recommends using the cPCl bus due to the advantages 
associated with using common hardware and should mitigate any bandwidth concern. 
Enclosure (9) evaluates using discrete or serial data links for communication between 
reactor controller channels and coincidence logic. Using serial links provides more mass 
savings, flexibility, and extensibility to the system. The same trade also evaluates the 
pros and cons of locating coincidence logic on a separate card or integrating it with the 
slider or drum controllers. This trade study concluded that serial data links had more 
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pros than discrete data. This trade study found the two options to be approximately 
equal in terms of pros and cons for the iocation of the coincidence logic. 
Enclosure (1 0) evaluates using two slider motor windings versus using a single motor 
winding. The outcome of this trade centers around differences in architecture for the two 
options and an increase in fault tolerance is traded with increased mass, cost, and 
volume. This trade study found the two options to be approximately equal in terms of 
pros and cons for the use of two slider motor windings and using a single motor winding. 
Enclosure (1 1) evaluates the advantages and disadvantages of implementing a single 
control tier versus two control tiers for reacior supervisors and reactor controllers. It also 
evaluates the advantages and disadvantages of using the spacecraft flight computer as 
the reactor module's supervisor instead of having a separate supervisor computer within 
the reactor module. The trade for a single control tier provides savings in mass, cost, 
and volume with the possible decrease in fault tolerance and reliability. This trade 
concluded that using a two control tier has more advantages than using a single control 
tier. 
Enclosure (1 2) evaluates the advantages and disadvantages of the slider controller level 
of programmability. Designing the slider controllers to have the capability of software 
modification post launch could provide more system flexibility. Designing a system that 
does not allow modification of software may provide less fault tolerance, but the deletion 
of programming circuitry may offset this disadvantage and may increase system 
reliability. This trade was inconclusive and further evaluation would need to be done for 
future missions. 
Enclosure (1 3) evaluates the advantages and disadvantages for having independent 
Reactor Controller Channels (RCCs) versus cross-connecting the RCCs. Cross- 
connected channels may have more fault tolerance, but with an increase in complexity. 
This trade study found the two options to be approximately equal in terms of pros and 
cons for the use of cross-connected channels and independent channels. 
Enclosure (14) evaluates three options for a reactor controller channel redundancy 
configuration including one hot backup channel, one cold backup channel, and no 
backup channels. An increase in backup channels may increase fault tolerance, and 
reliability while sacrificing simplicity, mass, cost, and volume. This trade study concluded 
that having a hot backup channel had more pros than the other options. 
Enclosure (1 5) documents the formal decision process followed and the conclusions 
reached. The decision process was performed on the notional architecture (Enclosure 
(4)) against Architecture 2 (Enclosure (5)), and also against cross-connected versions of 
each architecture as described in Enclosure (13). 
Conclusion: 
A decision process was performed rating the notional architecture against Architecture 2,  and 
also against cross-connected versions of each architecture. Architecture 2 rated the most 
favorable in reliability and cost, and was tied for the best rating in other categories such as 
mass, flexibility, extensibility, simplicity, testability, response time, and troubleshooting. 
Following the decision process, Architecture 2 was modified to include more operational detail 
for the configuration management, valve and safety rod control systems, and other minor 
changes. This version of Architecture 2 was renamed to be the preconceptual I&C system 
architecture and, as described in Enclosure ( I ) ,  is the architecture selected for further evaluation 
for a deep space nuclear propulsion mission extensible to surface missions. 
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Future Work: 
Future trade studies that would be required if this space reactor work is resumed are outlined in 
Enclosure (3). Additional trades would need to be performed to support a future submittal of a 
final architecture once mission requirements are developed and the reactor and plant designs 
are sufficiently mature. These include, but are not limited to: 
r Impact of sensor accuracy on control band 
a Multiple position sensors vs. a Single position sensor per slider actuator 
Continuous or Step control for SliderlDrum actuation 
0 Static versus Dynamic SliderlDrum selection 
r Asynchronous versus Synchronous Communication 
Two channel versus three channel Coincidence Logic 
HoWarmICold versus HotlWarmNVarm Supervisor Channel Configuration 
Separation of Control versus Limitation Functions 
The most significant of these is the Separation of Control versus Limitation Functions trade 
study. This trade study would evaluate the advantages and disadvantages of a system 
architecture that uses the Supervisor Channel for operational control of the sliders and uses the 
Reactor Controller Channels (with coincidence) to provide a protective (limiting) action with the 
sliders to maintain the plant within operating limits. All architectures considered during the KT 
(described in Enclosure (1 5)) combined control and limitation functions in the Reactor Controller 
Channels. Potential advantages of separating the control and limitation functions are: 
r Provides functional diversity mitigating common mode failures by providing a second 
echelon which must be breached before a loss of mission occurs. 
Simplifies individual single slider selection for control due to removal of coincidence. 
Simplifies the application of coincidence logic to limitation actions since it is only applied 
to slider movement and not slider selection if bank slider motion is used. 
A major disadvantage is that a separate set of Reactor plant sensors would be required, which 
increases mass of the system. 
Requested Action: 
This letter is provided to NR for information. No NR action is requested. 
Concurrence: 
This letter and its enclosures have been reviewed and concurred to by the Manager of KAPL 
SPP Space Electrical Systems (K. Loomis), the Manager of KAPL Space Power Plant Systems 
(H. Schwartzman), the Manager of KAPL Space Energy Conversion (J. Ashcroft), the Manager 
of KAPL Space Reactor Engineering (D. McCoy), the Manager of Bettis Space Reactor 
Engineering (C. Eshelman), the Manager of Bettis Space Plant Systems (D. Hagerty) and the 
Engineering Manager of BPMI-P Technical Assurance and Development Department (S. 
Gazarik). 
Very truly yours, p p w c 4 d  c2Q3-V) 
v Jessica N. Ross, Engineer 
Space Electrical Systems 
Space Power Program 
Approved by: 
Jm@4-f-- 
Matthew Ryan, Manager 
Space Electrical Systems-Systems and Software Design 
Space Power Program 
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